




“CAPTIVE MARKETS”: THE IMPACT OF KIDNAPPINGS ON 
CORPORATE INVESTMENT IN COLOMBIA 
 





This paper measures the impact of crime on firm investment by exploiting variation in 
kidnappings in Colombia from 1996 to 2002. Our central result is that firms invest less 
when kidnappings target firms. We also find that aggregate crime rates—homicides, 
guerrilla attacks, and general kidnappings—have no significant effect on investment. 
This finding alleviates concerns that our main result may be driven by unobserved 
variables that explain both overall criminal activity and investment. Furthermore, 
kidnappings that target firms reduce not only the investment of firms that sell in local 
markets, but also the investment of firms that sell in foreign markets. Thus, an 
unobservable correlation between poor demand conditions and criminal activity is 
unlikely to explain the negative impact of firm-related kidnappings on investment. Our 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that managers are reluctant to invest when 
their freedom and life are at risk; however, we cannot completely discard alternative 
explanations. 
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“MERCADOS CAUTIVOS”: EL IMPACTO DE LOS SECUESTROS 








Este artículo mide el impacto del crimen sobre la inversión de las empresas, 
explotando la variación de los secuestros en Colombia entre 1996 y 2002. 
Nuestro principal resultado es que las empresas invierten menos cuando los 
secuestros afectan directamente a los empresarios. También encontramos que 
tasas de crimen agregado—homicidios, ataques guerrilleros y secuestros en 
general—no tienen un efecto significativo sobre la inversión. Este resultado 
auxiliar sugiere que nuestro resultado principal no se debe a variables no 
observadas que expliquen tanto la actividad criminal como la inversión.   
Además, mostramos que los secuestros que afectan a los empresarios reducen 
no sólo la inversión de las empresas que venden en los mercados locales, sino 
también la inversión de empresas que venden en mercados extranjeros.  Por 
tanto, es poco probable que una correlación entre condiciones adversas de 
demanda y actividad criminal pueda explicar el impacto negativo sobre la 
inversión de los secuestros que afectan a los empresarios. Nuestros resultados 
son consistentes con la hipótesis que los empresarios tienen menos incentivos a 
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Clasificación JEL: K42, O16, D74, P14, G30.   3
 
“Who wants to invest money and effort in building a business if 
their reward is to risk losing their life and/or their money?” 
   The Economist, June 19th, 2004 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Although it is commonly assumed that crime deters investment, the magnitude of the effect is 
unknown.  Measuring this magnitude, however, has important policy implications because the 
negative effects of crime may explain why capital does not flow from rich countries to poor 
countries (Lucas, 1990).  In fact, Katz et al. (2001) suggest that fear of crime is one of the main 
reasons why households move out of high poverty neighborhoods, and Porter (1995) argues that 
firms stay away from inner cities to avoid crime. Fighting crime may be as important for 
developing countries as other economic reforms aimed at fostering investment and growth. 
  
Recent studies argue that institutions protecting property rights promote investment and 
economic prosperity (North, 1981; Besley, 1995; Acemoglu et al., 2001).  When the government 
is weak, crime and disorder threaten property rights; however, excessively strong rulers and 
dictators frequently endanger property rights as well (De Long and Shleifer, 1993).  Therefore, 
balancing off the costs of dictatorship and disorder is a fundamental problem of institutional 
design (Djankov et al., 2003).  Importantly, crime may deter investment both because it 
endangers property and because it threatens the lives and freedom of individuals themselves. 
 
Following Becker (1968), most empirical studies of crime seek to explain the economic rationale 
behind criminal behavior and also to measure the efficiency of deterrence mechanisms.
1  In a 
different line of research, recent cross-country studies suggest that political instability, crime, and 
terrorism are costly for economic activity.  For example, Barro (1991) and Alesina and Perotti 
(1996) find that politically unstable countries exhibit lower growth and investment rates.  Similarly, 
using survey data on Latin America, Gaviria (2002) finds that the growth of firms’ sales is lower in 
countries where managers believe that crime is an obstacle to doing business.  More direct 
evidence can be seen in Figure 1, which shows that kidnappings per capita and investment rates 
are negatively correlated in a panel of 196 countries from 1968 to 2002.  In particular, Gross 
Capital Formation and net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as percentage of GDP are lower when 
                                                 
1 Glaeser (1999) surveys the “crime and punishment” literature.   4
kidnapping rates are higher.
2  Each point in the figure is a country-year observation, and the solid 
line corresponds to the OLS estimate of a regression of investment on kidnappings per capita and 




Although suggestive, the evidence from cross-country studies is not entirely satisfactory because 
reverse causation and omitted variables may explain the negative relation between crime and 
investment.  A particularly important concern is that poor economic conditions may reduce 
investment and also increase the incentives to commit crimes. 
 
In contrast to the previous literature, this paper exploits firm-level data in Colombia to measure 
the effect of crime on investment.  Focusing on firm-level data within a single country has several 
advantages over cross-country studies.  First, we are able to compare the effect of crimes that 
are specifically targeted against firms to the effect of broader definitions of criminal activity.  To 
the extent that omitted variables affect all types of crime in a similar way, we identify the effect of 
crime from the differential impact of crime targeted at firms.  Second, we can exploit differences in 
firm characteristics to address the concern that an unobservable correlation between criminal 
activity and demand conditions might explain the negative relationship between crime and 
investment.  In particular, we compare the effect of crime on firms that sell in Colombian markets 
and firms that sell in foreign markets.  Whereas a story of omitted demand variables would 
suggest that a negative correlation between crime and investment should only be apparent for 
firms selling to local markets, firms selling to all markets should be affected equally if crime has a 
direct effect on investment.  Third, unobserved cultural and institutional characteristics, such as 
attitudes toward crime and law enforcement, and crime reporting standards are arguably more 
homogeneous within a country than across countries.
3   
 
Colombia provides a particularly useful environment to study the economic consequences of 
violent crime, because it has experienced high levels of crime during the past decade.  The 
combination of guerrillas, paramilitaries, and drug trafficking has given Colombia the highest per 
capita rates of homicides and kidnappings in the world since the early 1990s.  Furthermore, there 
                                                 
2 Appendix 1 contains a detailed description of the data used in Figure 1, and Appendix Table 1 reports the regression 
results.  The negative relation between kidnappings and investment rates is robust to controlling for lagged GDP per 
capita, and year and country effects. 
3 A study that is similar in spirit to our paper is Abadie and Gardezabal (2003), who use an event-study methodology to 
show that terrorism reduces firms’ returns in the Basque Country.  Our findings complement their study because we focus 
on firm-related crime and not on general forms of crime.   5
has been substantial variation in criminal activity both over time and across regions.  The total 
number of kidnappings almost tripled from 1996 to 2000.
4  In 2002, Medellin, the second largest 
city, reported almost four times the number of homicides per capita of Bogota, the largest city.
5   
 
In this paper we examine the impact of firm-related kidnappings on the investment of firms in 
Colombia.  Using a detailed dataset on kidnappings from FONDELIBERTAD, a governmental 
organization in Colombia, we are able to distinguish whether kidnappings target individuals that 
own or work for a firm.  This information is useful because it allows us to isolate the effect of the 
criminal activity that target firms from general types of crime.   
 
The main result of this paper is that kidnappings that target firms have a significantly negative 
impact on investment.  Our estimates suggest that a one-standard deviation increase in firm-
related kidnappings would reduce the investment rate of the average firm from 0.29% to -0.28% 
of total assets.  Other forms of violence—such as homicides, and the total number of 
kidnappings—do not have a statistically or economically significant effect on investment.  The fact 
that not all forms of violence matter for investment suggests that unobserved variables that 
explain overall criminal activity and investment are not driving our main result.   
 
We compare the effect of kidnappings on firms that differ in their ability to sell in foreign markets, 
and find that firms are affected by kidnappings regardless of the tradability of their industry.  This 
finding alleviates the concern that unobservable demand conditions may explain the negative 
correlation between firm-related kidnappings and investment.  We also find that kidnappings in 
the same industry have a stronger impact than kidnappings in other industries, and that 
investment of foreign firms is more responsive to kidnappings of foreigners than to kidnappings of 
Colombians.  This evidence suggests that crime makes managers reluctant to invest when their 
lives and freedom are at risk.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II presents a brief historical background of 
Colombia and explains the dataset.  The results in Section III show that some types of crime, 
especially when targeted against firms, matter more for investment than other types (such as total 
homicides and total kidnappings).  Section IV compares alternative explanations for the negative 
effect of firm-related kidnappings on investment.  Section V concludes and suggests further 
research topics. 
                                                 
4 FONDELIBERTAD.  In section II we discuss a dataset on kidnappings in Colombia. 
5 Colombia’s National Police.   6
II.  FIRMS AND CRIME IN COLOMBIA:  A UNIQUE DATASET 
  
A.  Historical Background 
 
For a country of its level of development, Colombia is highly violent.  The United Nations, for 
example, reports that Colombia has the highest annual rate of homicides per capita in the world:  
63 per 100,000 people.  By contrast, the average homicide rate in South America is 41 per 
100,000 people and the average homicide rate in OECD countries is 3 per 100,000 people.
6 
 
Figure 2, which plots homicides per capita since 1946, illustrates that violence is not a recent 
phenomenon in Colombia.  Homicide rates increase sharply in the 1940s as a consequence of a 
civil war between the two main political parties.  During the war, known by historians as “The 
Violence”, groups of peasants take arms against government persecution.  The political end of 
the civil war does not translate into lower homicide rates in the 1960s, as some of these 
resistance groups evolve into guerrillas like FARC (Revolutionary Army Forces of Colombia), the 
largest rebel group still active in the Western hemisphere.
7  Homicide rates skyrocket in the 
1980s and 1990s when Colombia becomes a major producer of cocaine.  Drug trafficking 
increases violence as the government prosecutes drug lords and, at the same time, cartels fight 
for market control.
8  Finally, during the last decades of the 20
th century, powerful economic 
interests—some legal, some illegal—organize right-wing groups of vigilantes or paramilitaries to 
protect their businesses from guerrilla extortion.
9  
 
 [ Figure 2] 
 
The dramatic increase in homicides during the 1980s and 1990s is consistent with increases in 
other measures of violence.  In particular, Figure 3 shows that both kidnappings and guerrilla 
attacks rise steadily throughout the 1990s and finally peak in 2000.
10  Kidnappings and guerrilla 
activity are correlated because rebels kidnap for political reasons and also use ransoms to 
finance their fight against the government.  Despite this high correlation, guerrillas do not have 
the monopoly in the kidnapping industry:  rebels compete against paramilitaries, gangs, and even 
                                                 
6 United Nations, Seventh Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice.  It covers the period 1998-2000. 
7 See, for example, Safford and Palacios (2002, Chapters 11-14).  However, not all guerrilla movements in Colombia 
evolved from peasant resistance:  the still active ELN (National Army of Liberation) is an important exception. 
8 See Bowden (2002) and Bergquist et al. (2001).  By looking at the relocation of coca crops across Andean countries, 
Angrist and Kugler (2004) provide evidence that increases in coca crops spur violence in Colombia. 
9 Both guerrilla and paramilitaries have been linked with drug trafficking in recent years.  See, for example, Streatfeild 
(2002, Chapters 18 and 19). 
10 Guerrilla attacks (FARC) include bombings, arm-trafficking, massacres, ambushes, piracy, and confrontation with Army 
or National Police.    7
drug cartels.  In News of a Kidnapping, for instance, Garcia Marquez reconstructs the story of 
seven notorious kidnappings in 1989, when the Medellin cartel uses hostages to force the 
Colombian government to turn down an extradition treaty with the US.  After the increase in 
kidnappings during the 1990s, Colombia becomes the country with the highest absolute number 
of kidnappings and the highest kidnapping rate in the world.
11 
 
 [ Figure 3] 
 
The persistence of high rates of violent crime has led Colombian economists to study to the 
problem of measuring the cost of crime and conflict.
12  In particular, Rubio (1995) uses aggregate 
data to show that recent increases in crime rates in Colombia are correlated with lower GDP 
growth.  With a similar methodology, Cardenas (2002) argues that Colombia’s productivity 
slowdown in the 1990s can be partly attributed to the acceleration in overall criminal activity.  
(The acceleration in homicide rates, for example, is apparent in Figure 2.)   
 
The interest showed by Colombian economists during the 1990s is one of the reasons why 
researchers have now access to improved statistics on criminal activity.
13  New and detailed 
datasets make possible to assess the effects of crime on household and individual outcomes.  In 
recent papers, for example, Barrera and Ibañez (2004) study the effects of crime on education 
and Urdinola (2004) studies the effects on infant mortality.  Taking advantage of improved 
datasets, we use variation in different measures of violent crime (over time and across regions) to 
isolate the effect of crime on firm investment in Colombia.   
 
The map in Figure 4 illustrates that Colombia is divided into 32 regions or departments.  Although 
departments are similar to states in the US, they are not as autonomous, because Colombia is 
not a Federal Republic.  Although departments have limited ability to legislate and to tax income 
or consumption, they have some autonomy to distribute government expenditure in different 
types of local public goods (education, health, and public works, among others).  The Andean 
region in Colombia extends from the southern department of Nariño to the departments of 
Antioquia (next to Panama) and Norte de Santander (in the northeastern part of the country).  
The most important cities and the bulk of the population are located in the Andean departments.  
Tropical rain forests and plains comprise a significant part of southeastern Colombia. 
                                                 
11 Kroll, a private security advisor headquartered in New York, estimates that as of 2003 Colombia has roughly 4,000 
kidnappings per year, that Mexico has 3,000 kidnappings per year, and that Argentina has 2,000 per year. 
12 See Montenegro and Posada (2001) and Riascos and Vargas (2003) for surveys on the literature on costs of crime and 
violence in Colombia. 
13 Restrepo et al. (2004), for example, describe the construction of a detailed dataset on the Colombian conflict.   8
 [ Figure 4] 
 
B.  Kidnappings and Other Types of Crime 
 
One of the reasons why we focus on kidnappings is the quality of the available data.  Since 1996, 
FONDELIBERTAD, a governmental organization in Colombia, collects detailed information on 
individual kidnappings reported to Colombia’s Ministry of Defense.
14  For each kidnapping event, 
FONDELIBERTAD reports the date and department in which the kidnapping occurs, the identity 
of the kidnapper (guerrillas, paramilitaries, common criminals, or not determined), and the 
number of days in captivity.  More important, the dataset reports individual characteristics of the 
victim, including occupation and nationality.  Confidentiality restrictions, however, prevent access 
to detailed data on ransoms. 
 
The first 8 columns of Table 1 summarize the main characteristics of the FONDELIBERTAD 
dataset.  The first column shows that the dataset includes a total of 18,867 kidnappings from 
1996 to 2002; on average, about 2,700 kidnappings per year.  
 
 [ Table 1] 
 
The dataset attributes 56% of overall kidnappings to guerrillas, 14% to common criminals, and 
5% to paramilitaries.  (The identity of the kidnappers is unknown or not disclosed for the rest of 
the observations.)  According to the demands of the kidnappers, FONDELIBERTAD classifies 
abductions as having either economic or political ends.  Kidnappings for economic reasons 
typically involve a monetary ransom.  About 55% of the kidnappings in the sample are classified 
as having economic ends, while 10% of the kidnappings are classified as having purely political 
ends.
15  Although both Colombians and foreigners are victimized by kidnappings, only 2% of the 
victims are not Colombian citizens.  
 
1.  Kidnappings and firms 
To focus on the subset of kidnappings that target firms, we define the following four types of 
kidnappings:  (i) Kidnappings of Firms’ Owners, that include kidnappings in which the victim owns 
                                                 
14 FONDELIBERTAD is short for Fondo Nacional para la Defensa de la Libertad Personal (National Fund for the 
Protection of Individual Liberty), and it was established by law in 1996.  FONDELIBERTAD is not only responsible for 
processing data on kidnappings:  it also provides legal and psychological assistance to families affected by kidnappings, 
and advises government policies on kidnappings.  
15 The demands of the kidnappers are unknown for roughly 35% of the observations.     9
at least part of a firm;
16 (ii) Kidnappings of Firms’ Top Management, that include kidnappings in 
which the victims are board members or managers (CEOs, presidents, and vice-presidents); (iii) 
Kidnappings of Firms’ Top and Middle Management, that include kidnappings of top management 
plus supervisors and division managers; and (iv) Firm-Related Kidnappings, that include 
kidnappings in which the victims are owners, managers, regular employees, or contractors.   
Table 1 reports that around 10% of the kidnappings in the FONDELIBERTAD dataset are related 
to firms according to our definition (Column 2), and about 80% of firm-related kidnappings target 
top or middle management (Column 3).  
 
To compare the effects of kidnappings that target firms to other types of kidnappings, we consider 
two other categories.  We define government employees as individuals who worked for the local 
or national government (judiciary, executive, and legislative branches), or candidates running for 
public office at the time of the kidnapping.  We group members of the Army and National Police in 
a separate category, even though they are officially government employees.  Columns 6 and 7 of 
Table 1 report that 5% of the victims in the FONDELIBERTAD dataset are government 
employees and that 3% of the victims work for the Army or the National Police. 
 
Finally, a large fraction of the victims in the dataset are children or teenagers under 18 (about 
10%), self-employed individuals (about 45%), and members of not-for-profit organizations such 
as religious communities and NGOs (about 5%).  Occupation is unknown for 12% of the 
observations in the dataset.  
 
2.  Other types of crime 
To isolate the effect of kidnappings on investment from the effect of overall violence, we consider 
variables other than kidnappings that are closely related to the armed conflict and common crime.  
Based on reports from Colombia’s National Police and Army, the DNP (National Planning 
Department) compiles a dataset on different types of crime by department since 1995.  We focus 
on two of the most common types of violent crime in Colombia:  guerrilla attacks and homicides. 
 
Guerrilla attacks in the DNP dataset include arm trafficking, massacres, bombings, ambushes, 
piracy, and confrontations with the Army or the National Police.  We restrict attention to attacks by 
FARC for two reasons.  First, by the number of combatants and terrorist attacks, FARC is the 
largest rebel group in Colombia.  Second, while other rebel groups operate only in a handful of 
departments, FARC is spread throughout the country.  Homicides reported by DNP include all 
                                                 
16 The dataset does not disclose what fraction of the firm is owned.   10
kinds of violent deaths and not only killings related with the armed conflict.  The last two columns 
of Table 1 report the number of terrorist attacks and homicides from 1996 through 2002.  
 
It is important to note that the data on kidnappings are more detailed than the data on guerrilla 
attacks and homicides are.  The FONDELIBERTAD dataset on kidnappings allows us to identify 
the identity and the occupation of the victim (and hence, whether she works for a firm).  By 
contrast, the DNP dataset on guerrilla attacks and homicides does not allows us to identify 
individual victims within departments.   
 
The maps in Figure 5 illustrate the distribution of kidnappings, homicides, and guerrilla attacks 
per capita across departments in Colombia.
17  Although these three types of crime are correlated, 
some differences are worth noticing.  In particular, FARC are more likely to attack departments 
with a large fraction of rural population in the southeast of the country.  Moreover, rebels 
strategically target departments with abundant natural resources.  For example, Arauca, in the 
frontier with Venezuela, is rich in oil reserves and is a constant target of FARC attacks.  By 
contrast, homicides and kidnappings are more evenly distributed across departments than 
guerrilla attacks.




C.  Firms 
 
The Superintendencia de Valores, Colombia’s SEC, collects data on all firms that trade in the 
Colombian stock market.  Additionally, the Superintendencia de Sociedades, another government 
agency, collects income statements and balance sheets for a large sample of private firms.
19  
Merging these two datasets from 1996 to 2002 yields an unbalanced panel of 10,126 firms 
(37,582 firm-year observations) with complete information for regression analysis.  Table 2 
summarizes the distribution of firms over time and across industries according to the International 
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC).  Only a small fraction of firms is publicly traded, because 
                                                 
17 We exclude one department from the statistical analysis—the islands of San Andres and Providencia—because there is 
no information on crime and other regional characteristics.  Additionally, we treat the metropolitan area of Bogota—known 
as the Capital District—as a separate department, because it concentrates roughly 18% of Colombia’s population.  Data 
on population are from DANE (National Department of Statistics) and are described in Appendix Table 2. 
18 Collier and Hoeffler (2001) argue that the quest for social justice is not the only cause behind rebellions:  in fact, many 
rebellions pursue the capture of rents.  Diaz and Sanchez (2004) study the importance of these two types of causes for 
the location of FARC in Colombia. 
19 Before 2000 all firms incorporated in Colombia were obliged to report their financial statements to Superintendencia de 
Sociedades.  After 2000 only firms with assets above 20,000 monthly legal minimum wages are obliged to report.   
Although reporting is not mandatory for other firms, a large number of firms below the threshold continued reporting after 
2000.  The results in this paper are robust to excluding firms below the threshold during the entire sample.   11
the Colombian stock market is not fully developed (Panel A).  Roughly half of the observations in 





Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of the firms in the sample.
20  The average (median) firm-
year observation has real assets of 7.77 (2.43) million dollars.  Investment, defined as the change 
in net Property Plant and Equipment (PPE), scaled by assets is 0.29% for the average 
observation and -0.55% for the median.  Median investment is negative partly as a consequence 
of the economic downturn experienced by the country in most of the sample and partly as a 
consequence of the definition of investment, which includes depreciation.
21  The ratio of net 
income to total assets (ROA), a measure of profitability, is 0.03% for the average observation and 
1.55% for the median.  The ratio of cash to total assets is 6.50% for the average observation and 
2.62% for the median.  Assets, investment, profitability and cash holdings all report important 
dispersion, as the standard deviation is larger than the mean for the three variables. 
 
The last two rows of Table 3 report that roughly 17% of firm-year observations correspond to 
foreign firms.  We classify a firm as foreign if more than 10% of its shares are held by foreigners.  
Similarly, almost 27% of the observations correspond to a firm that has access to foreign 
markets, either exporting or importing.  Most firms, however, are domestic and sell exclusively in 
the Colombian market. 
 
 [ Table 3] 
 
As a consequence of Colombia’s geography and historical development, economic activity is 
concentrated in a handful of large cities.  The map in Figure 6, which depicts the geographic 
distribution of the firms in the sample, illustrates the high concentration of economic activity.  Most 
firms are located in the north and central areas of the country, on the Andes, or in the Caribbean 
coast.  In 2000, for example, roughly 55% of the firms in the sample locate in Bogota, D.C., and 
25% of the firms locate in the departments of Antioquia and Valle del Cauca, mainly in the capital 
                                                 
20 Nominal variables are deflated using the Producer Price Index (PPI), which is described in Appendix Table 2.  Total 
Assets are translated to U.S. dollars using the exchange rate in 1999, which is the base year of the PPI.  
21 We have no data on gross PPE or capital expenditure in the database.  The upside of not having the change in gross 
PPE is that the dependent variable is not censored at zero.   12
cities (Medellin and Cali, respectively).
22  However, more than 1,200 firms—almost 20% of the 
sample—were located in 21 departments other than the largest three.  Southeastern departments 
and the department of Choco (next to Panama) account for a small fraction of the firms in the 




In Table 4 we divide firm-year observations into a sample with high rates of total kidnapping and a 
sample with low rates.  Observations in the sample with high (low) rates of total kidnappings are 
located in department-years where kidnapping rates are above (below) the country median.   
Although the sample with low kidnapping risk has three times as many firms as the high-risk 
sample, firms in the high-risk sample are significantly larger.  While the investment rate is lower 
for the high-risk sample, the difference in investment rates between the two groups is not 
statistically significant.  Additionally, firms in the high-risk sample tend to hold less cash as a 





III.  IS INVESTMENT LOWER WHERE CRIME RATES ARE HIGHER? 
 
A.  Empirical Strategy 
 
To measure the impact of kidnappings on firm investment, our empirical strategy exploits two 
sources of variation.  First, we consider changes over time in kidnapping rates measured at the 
department-level.  Second, we compare the effect of kidnappings that target firm-related 
individuals with the effect of other types of kidnappings (and also to other types of crime). 
 
To estimate the effect of the kidnappings rate of department j on the investment of all firms 
located in that department, we control for characteristics of department j that may affect both 
investment decisions and incentives to kidnap.  Additionally, we control for firm characteristics 
that predict investment behavior. 
 
                                                 
22 In a robustness check, we confirm that our results do not change substantially by excluding firms that locate in Bogota, 
D.C.   13
In the traditional “crime and punishment” approach, individuals decide to commit crimes after 
weighting the costs and benefits of criminal behavior (Becker, 1968; Glaeser, 1999).  For 
example, adverse economic conditions reduce the opportunity cost of criminal activities.   
Supportive of this prediction, Fajnzylber et al. (2002) find that crime rates are counter-cyclical and 
Miguel et al. (2004) show that negative exogenous shocks in economic growth increase the 
likelihood of civil conflict in a sample of African countries.
23  Hence, economic conditions in 
department j may determine not only the investment decisions of firms in department j, but also 
the incentives of kidnappers in department j.  In our statistical analysis, we control for GDP per 
capita, poverty levels, public infrastructure, and primary school enrollment.
24  
 
We include homicides and guerrilla attacks in our regressions, because we do not want to 
confound the effect of kidnappings with the effect of the overall civil conflict.  To the extent that 
omitted variables affect all types of crime in a similar way, we identify the effect of crime on firm 
investment from the differential effect of crime specifically targeted against firms.
25 
 
Empirical studies of corporate investment typically find that firms with more cash and more 
favorable investment opportunities (or Tobin’s Q) invest more (Fazzari et al., 1988; Stein, 2003).
26  
In line with these standard results, we control for cash balances scaled by assets and 
approximate investment opportunities by using net income scaled by assets.  Forward-looking 
proxies for investment opportunities, such as the price-to-book ratio, are unavailable, because 
only few of the firms in the sample are publicly traded.  
 
We measure the impact of kidnappings on firm investment using the following regression, that we 
estimate using OLS:   
 
t i j k t i t j t i
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23 Recent studies challenge the conventional view that poverty generates terrorism.  For example, Abadie (2004) finds 
that terrorist risk is not significantly higher in poor countries, after controlling for country characteristics (including political 
freedom). 
24 Appendix Table 2 describes department-specific variables. 
25 Recent developments in the economics of crime suggest that social interactions explain an important component of the 
variance of crime both across cities and over time (Glaeser et al., 1996; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999).  In a framework 
where social interactions are important, the incentives to kidnap may depend on the intensity of other types of crime in the 
same time and place. 
26 Some authors use cash flow or cash balances as measures of financing constraints (Fazzari el al., 1988).  More recent 
findings challenge the interpretation that cash-flow sensitivities of investment are measures of financing constraints 
(Kaplan and Zingales, 1997).    14
 
where  i  indexes firms,  j  indexes departments,  t  indexes years, and  k  indexes industries.   
Investment is defined as the change in property, plant, and equipment; and TA denotes total 
assets.  Kidnappings, Guerrilla Attacks, and Homicides are measured at the department level and 
scaled by 100,000 people.  Xi,t denotes the vector of firm-specific controls:  log of total assets, 
cash holdings scaled by total assets, and net income scaled by total assets.  Similarly,  Zj,t 
represents the vector of department controls:  GDP per capita, primary school enrollment, a 
poverty index similar to the one-dollar-a-day standard, and the extension of roads in 1995.   i φ ,  t η , 
k λ , and  j µ  represent firm, year, industry, and department fixed effects, respectively.  Finally, 
because observations of firms in the same department are not truly independent, we cluster 
standard errors by department.
27 
 
Incentives to invest today are generally based on predictions about the future.  If crime rates in 
year t −1 have a negative effect on investment in year t, implicitly we assume that lagged crime 
rates are good predictors of future crime rates (and hence, future conditions that are potentially 
relevant for investment).  In fact, univariate time series analysis that we do not report here 
suggests that the rates of kidnappings, homicides, and guerrilla attacks are autoregressive and 
stationary processes.  Furthermore, positive shocks to crime rates in the past predict higher crime 
rates in the future.
28   
 
B.  Main Results 
 
1.  Kidnappings that target firms 
Table 5 reports OLS estimates of equation (1) that include different types of kidnappings as 
explanatory variables.  The first three regressions in the table consider kidnappings whose 
victims are not directly linked to firms, and the last four regressions consider kidnappings whose 




Although most types of kidnappings have a negative effect on firm investment, only kidnappings 
that target firm-related individuals have an effect that is statistically different from zero.  To 
                                                 
27 Results are robust to clustering by year-department. 
28 Results are robust to using a two-period average of kidnapping rates and to use contemporary kidnappings as opposed to lagged 
kidnappings.   15
illustrate the economic magnitude of the effects of different types of kidnappings, consider the 
thought experiment of raising kidnapping rates within a department.  A one-standard deviation 
increase in the rate of firm-related kidnappings is associated with a reduction in investment of 
0.57% (= 0.44%*1.30) of total assets (Regression 4).
29  The effects associated with kidnappings 
are not negligible, as average investment in the sample is 0.29% of total assets.  Similar 
differences arise when we rank regions into quartiles based on the rate of firm-related 
kidnappings.  Firms in the most dangerous quartile invest in terms of assets 0.40% less than 
firms in the least dangerous quartile.
30  
 
By contrast, kidnappings whose victims are not related to firms have a statistically insignificant 
effect on corporate investment.  In particular, kidnappings that target government employees, or 
the Army and National Police are unrelated to investment.  Although some coefficients are large 
in magnitude, they are imprecisely estimated.  More important, the coefficient on total 
kidnappings is also not statistically significant. 
 
To compare the effects of kidnappings that target firms with the effects of general forms of crime, 
Table 5 reports the coefficients on the rates of homicides and guerrilla attacks in regression (1).  
While firm-related kidnappings have significant effects on investment, these general types of 
crime, that do not target firms directly, have no significant effect on investment (either economic 
or statistical).  This finding alleviates concerns that our results with firm-related kidnappings might 
be explained by unobserved variables that drive both overall criminal activity and investment.
31  
The identifying assumption in equation (1) is that unobserved variables have no differential effect 
across different types of crime.  For example, if economic conditions that are not captured by 
GDP affect both criminal activity and corporate investment, we assume that all types of crime are 
equally affected by such economic conditions.
32    
 
At first glance, our results with guerrilla attacks seem to be at odds with recent papers that 
document a negative effect of terrorism on economic activity.  In particular, from a case study of 
the Basque country, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) conclude that terrorism reduces GDP 
growth and stock market returns.  The type of regions that terrorism targets in Colombia may 
                                                 
29 Appendix Table 3 reports summary statistics of the series of kidnappings, homicides, and guerrilla attacks. 
30 Comparing firms in the most violent quartile with firms the least dangerous quartile is equivalent to comparing firms in 
Antioquia (where infamous Medellin cartel operates in the 1980s and 1990s) with firms in Bogota, D.C. 
31 For example, we are unable to observe attitudes towards crime, the effectiveness of local courts and local police, which 
are likely to affect incentives of both entrepreneurs and kidnappers. 
32 As an illustration, we assume kidnappings of government employees and kidnappings of managers are equally 
countercyclical.     16
explain the inconsistency.  While terrorists in the Basque country attack cities, where most firms 
locate, terrorists in Colombia attack mainly rural areas.   
 
 
2.  Firms directly affected 
Finding that firms directly attacked by kidnappings are forced to cut back on investment would be 
unsurprising.  After all, kidnappings of employees disrupt production and firms may be forced to 
pay for ransoms.  However, we find a more surprising—and perhaps more interesting—result:  
the negative effects of firm-related kidnappings on investment decisions go beyond the subset of 
firms directly affected; firms that face a high risk of kidnappings reduce investment even when 
their own employees are not victims of kidnappings.  Potentially, the indirect effect is more 
harmful for aggregate industrial activity than the direct effect, because it spills over to a larger 
group of firms.  
 
Of all the kidnappings in the FONDELIBERTAD dataset, we classify 1,985 as having some direct 
relation with firms.  Of this sample of firm-related kidnappings, we are able to identify the name of 
the firm the victim worked for in 1,123 observations.  However, only 147 firms in our sample were 
directly affected by the kidnappings reported by FONDELIBERTAD, which represents less than 
1% of the observations.  Table 6 reports the results of estimating equation (1) for two groups of 
firms separately:  (i) firms that we identify as being directly attacked by kidnappings, and (ii) the 




An important observation derives from the separate analysis of these two groups of firms:   
kidnappings have a significant impact on firms that have not been directly affected.  The impact 
on the subset of victimized firms is larger in magnitude but not statistically significant, perhaps 
because the estimation is based on a considerably smaller sample.  The evidence in Table 6 
suggests that it is unlikely that the negative effect of firm-related kidnappings on investment is 
driven by the inclusion of firms whose employees are victims of kidnappings. 
 
3.  Kidnappings in the same industry and kidnappings in other industries 
If individuals make decisions based on the conditional probability of becoming victims, the most 
relevant kidnappings for a CEO working on a given industry are those occurring in the same line 
of business.  To test this conjecture, we compute for each industry-department cell the following   17
two variables:  (i) the number of firm-related kidnappings that affect the same industry in other 
departments (Kidnappings Same Industry), and (ii) the number of firm-related kidnappings 
affecting all other industries in all other departments, divided by the number of industries 
(Kidnappings Other Industries).
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Using these variables, we estimate the following regression:   
 
t i j k t i t j t i




Ind   Other   s Kidnapping Ind   Same   s Kidnapping
TA
Investment
, 1 , 1 ,





ε µ λ η φ γ π
β β α
+ + + + + + +
⋅ + ⋅ + =
− −
− −
−      (2), 
 
All definitions follow equation (1), except for the kidnappings variables explained above and the 
vector of department controls,  X
~
,  which is redefined, for notational convenience, to include 
homicides and guerrilla attacks as well.  
 
Panel A in Table 7 summarizes the results of estimating equation (2) by OLS.  The negative 
effect of kidnappings on investment is statistically significant regardless of the industry affected, 
but the magnitude is larger for own-industry kidnappings.  The magnitude of the coefficients is not 
comparable to those in previous tables, because kidnappings are not scaled by 100,000 




The result that own-industry kidnappings have larger effects than kidnappings in other industries 
is consistent with various explanations.  First, rational and fully informed CEOs make corporate 
decisions based on the conditional probability of being kidnapped; hence, when other CEOs in 
the same industry are kidnapped, they revise upwards the probability of victimization.   
Alternatively, less than fully informed CEOs are more likely to share information (or have a 
                                                 
33 Industrial activity tends to cluster by regions.  Hence, to avoid confusing the effect of kidnappings in the same 
department with the effect of kidnappings in the same industry, we exclude observations in the same department in the 
definitions of own-industry kidnappings and other-industry kidnappings.   18
common source of information) with CEOs in the same industry; hence, they only revise the 
probability of kidnappings upwards when the victim is someone they know or someone they can 
identify themselves with. 
 
4.  Foreign firms and kidnappings of foreign citizens 
Firm-related kidnappings of foreign citizens are likely to be more relevant for foreign CEOs than 
firm-related kidnappings of Colombians.  To test this hypothesis, we estimate the following 
regression:   
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where Kidnap. Colombians is the rate of firm-related kidnappings with Colombian victims, and 
Kidnap. Foreigners is the rate of firm-related kidnappings with non-Colombian victims.  Both 
definitions of kidnappings are scaled by 100,000 population.  Foreign is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 for firms with more than 10% of foreign ownership.  The definition of all other variables 
follows equation (2).  
 
Panel B of Table 7 reports OLS estimates of the coefficients on kidnappings variables and 
interactions terms in equation (3).  First, we focus on the interaction between the rate of foreign 
kidnappings and the foreign firm dummy.  The estimate reported in Panel B suggests that foreign 
firms are significantly more sensitive to kidnappings of foreign citizens than Colombian firms are.  
Second, we focus on the interaction between the rate of kidnappings of Colombians and the 
foreign firm dummy.  The estimate reported in Panel B suggests that Colombian firms are 
significantly more sensitive to kidnappings of Colombian citizens than foreign firms.  These 
results should be treated with caution, as the number of Colombian firms is five times larger than 
the number of foreign firms. 
 
5.  Discussion 
The results of this paper should be considered a conservative measure of the negative effect of 
kidnappings on investment for at least three reasons.  First, firms choose not only how much to 
invest every year, but also whether to continue operating or shutting down; which can be   19
considered an extreme form of disinvestment.  The sample consists of active firms and, 
presumably, surviving firms invest more than firms that exit; hence biasing the estimate of the 
effect of kidnappings on crime towards zero.  However, the importance of entry and exit decisions 
is hard to assess, because Superintendencia de Sociedades changed reporting standards in 
2000, and hence not all firms that stopped reporting really shut down.  The bias introduced by the 
change in reporting standards is also hard to quantify since we do not observe whether firms that 
stopped reporting invest more or less than firms that kept reporting. 
 
A second reason why the results of this paper could be conservative is that kidnappers may 
target employees that work for firms that have more cash-on-hand.  Criminals may follow this 
strategy if firms are likely to use this cash to pay ransoms, regardless of the economic status of 
the victim.  Unfortunately, we cannot determine with the available information whether firms really 
use their own cash to pay ransoms and free their employees.  If this is the case, however, we 
should expect the results to be biased towards zero, since cash-abundant firms tend to invest 
more than financially constrained firms. However, it seems plausible that kidnappers target 
individuals based on their own wealth, rather than based on financial information of the firm they 
work for. 
 
Finally, we are only able to establish a link between an individual and a firm when the individual 
works for the firm.  The variable Firm-Related Kidnappings is very conservative, since it does not 
take into account other possible relations between firms and individuals.  For instance, 10% of 
victims in the FONDELIBERTAD dataset are children or teenagers, who might be related to 
employees, managers, or owners.  The exclusion of family members of the definition of firm-
related kidnappings biases the estimates towards finding no effect of crime on investment. 
 
On the other hand, our results may overstate the detrimental effect of kidnappings on firm-level 
investment if kidnappers specifically target low-investment firms.  We cannot totally rule out this 
possibility, but there are reasons to believe that this might not be true.  In particular, although 
many kidnappings in Colombia have an economic motive, guerillas, paramilitaries, and drug lords 
have exploited kidnappings for political reasons too.  In the early 1990s, for example, drug-
dealers kidnapped the relatives of the Colombian political and business elite with the purpose of 
pressing the government to revoke an extradition treaty with the US.
34  In more recent times, 
businessmen, majors, soldiers, and even presidential candidates have been abducted to 
negotiate the release of imprisoned rebels.  
                                                 
34 Garcia Marquez (1994) and Bowden (1998).   20
 
Since crime rates are far higher in Colombia than in most other countries, it may be argued that 
the evidence presented here is not representative of the effect of crime on investment.  Colombia 
is, however, similar in various dimensions to other countries that experience high crime rates.  
For example, according to the United Nations, four out of the ten most violent countries in terms 
of per capita homicides are Latin American.
35  In addition, the average GDP per capita of the ten 
most violent places is, in 2000 US dollars, 7,340, while the average GDP per capita of Colombia 
is 6,340.
36  As many developing countries experience high rates of violent crime, the findings in 
this section suggest that crime may explain why capital does not flow to poor countries. 
 
IV.  WHY DOES CRIME REDUCE INVESTMENT? PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE 
 
“It’s bad enough when you read about it in the paper, but when it happens to 
someone you know—he shakes his head—that really brings it home to you.” 
       Coetzee  (Disgrace, 1999, p. 102) 
 
From a theoretical point of view, several hypotheses may explain why firm-related kidnappings 
reduce investment.  In this section, we discuss some of these explanations and use firm and 
industry characteristics to analyze which of them are plausible.  Although the evidence presented 
in this section is far from conclusive, we believe it is helpful to clarify the mechanisms that are 
most likely to affect investment decisions in situations that endanger personal security. 
 
The threat posed by kidnappings may affect investment broadly through four mechanisms.  First, 
a high probability of kidnapping may induce managers to operate under the fear of being 
expropriated, deprived from their liberty, or killed.  Fear may distract managers from exploiting 
investment opportunities, because investing in physical capital is a commitment to stay in a 
particular place.  Managers are likely to be reluctant to create physical ties to an unsafe 
environment.  We call this hypothesis the fear channel.  
 
Second, kidnappings may reduce demand for goods and services:  during violent periods, 
households may decide to consume fewer goods or services if consuming them is dangerous (for 
example, dining out or going to a shopping center), or even to migrate to safer regions.  Firms 
                                                 
35 United Nations, Seventh Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice.  It covers the period 1998-2000.  
The countries with the ten highest rates of homicides are, in order:  Colombia, South Africa, Jamaica, Venezuela, Russia, 
Mexico, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Belarus. 
36 World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2002.   21
that expect demand to decrease may, as a consequence, invest less.  We call this mechanism 
the demand channel. 
Third, firms that face a high probability of being victimized by kidnappings may face tighter 
financial constraints, if financial institutions are reluctant to finance firms when money can be 
diverted to unproductive activities, like paying ransoms.  In addition, banks will deliberately stay 
out of a region during violent times to protect their owners and employees.  This decision of 
banks may reduce the supply of external funds especially if banks rely mostly on soft information.  
We call this hypothesis the credit constraints channel.  
 
Finally, kidnappings may increase the cost of doing business:  firms in regions with high 
kidnappings rates face higher security costs, such as bodyguards, armored cars, and intelligence 
services.  Private security firms in Mexico, for instance, estimate that large firms spend between 
20,000 and 30,000 dollars per month to protect their executives from kidnappings.  We call this 
hypothesis the cost channel. 
 
The evidence in Section III is not necessarily inconsistent with the demand, the credit, or the cost 
channels; however, our results tend to favor the fear channel.  In particular, our analysis suggests 
that when firms perceive an increase in the conditional probability of being the target of 
kidnappings, they tend to invest less.  Firm-related kidnappings of foreigners, for example, have a 
stronger effect on the investment of foreign firms.  Similarly, firm-related kidnappings in a given 
industry have a strong impact on that industry.  Perhaps, more important, we control for a number 
of determinants of investment that should take into account the risk of expropriation and demand 
conditions (for example, profitability).  The objective of this section is to provide more detailed 
evidence on the mechanisms through which crime deters investment. 
 
A.  Fear Channel 
 
Investing in physical capital typically involves a commitment to stay in the place where capital is 
installed.  If physical capital and human capital are complements, managers that fear for their 
lives, health, and property may be reluctant to invest during times when kidnapping rates are 
unusually high.  In this section, we provide evidence that links a threat to human capital (i.e., 
kidnappings) to the incentive to invest in physical capital, by identifying firms that are more likely 
to be committed to a particular place after investing. 
   22
Firms with a large fraction of fixed assets are typically more committed to the place where they 
invest than firms with a small fraction of fixed assets.  Table 8 compares the effect of firm-related 
kidnappings across industries that differ in the tangibility of their assets.  We measure industry 
tangibility using PPE as a percentage of assets.  Notably, the interaction between firm-related 
kidnappings and industry tangibility is positive and statistically significant.  This finding suggests 
that the negative effect of firm-related kidnappings is stronger on firms that are highly committed 
to the place where they operate.   
 
 [ Table 8] 
 
B.  Demand Channel 
 
The results in Section III provide indirect evidence that the mechanism through which kidnappings 
reduce investment is not a fall in demand, because the baseline regressions already control for 
net income scaled by assets (ROA) at the firm level and GDP at the department level.  This 
section, however, provides additional evidence that is not easy to reconcile with the demand 
channel.  In particular, we compare the response of firms that depend on Colombian markets to 
the response of firms with access to foreign markets. 
 
If kidnappings reduce investment through a decrease in local consumption, investment by firms 
that have access to alternative markets should be less sensitive to kidnappings than investment 
by firms that sell in local markets only.  Firms that sell in foreign markets may be able to shift 
production to foreign markets when local demand falls.   
 
Table 9 compares the effect of firm-related kidnappings on firms that operate in industries that 
differ in their ability to sell in foreign markets.  More formally, we estimate by OLS the following 
equation: 
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where Industry Tradability is the fraction of exports in total sales.
37  The definition of all other 
variables follows equation (2).  The interaction terms between industry tradability and different 
rates of kidnappings that target firms are not statistically significant.  Although the evidence is not 
conclusive, the results in Table 9 are hard to reconcile with the demand channel.  Perhaps more 
important, the absence of a differential effect for firms that depend exclusively on local markets 
alleviates the concern that our results may be driven by omitted demand variables.     
 
 [ Table 9] 
 
C.  Credit Constraints Channel 
 
Since the markets for corporate bonds and equity in Colombia are thin, the most common form of 
external financing in Colombia is bank debt.  If kidnappings that target firms reduce investment 
through a tightening in credit constraints, firms should contract less debt when kidnapping rates 
go up.  To test this hypothesis, Table 10 reports OLS estimates of the effects of kidnappings on 
individual firm borrowing.  The dependent variable in the regression is the change in bank debt 
scaled by assets.
38  While the results in Section III suggest that firm-related kidnappings are 
negatively correlated with firm investment, there is no consistent evidence that firms contract less 




In Appendix Table 4 we report the effect of firm-related kidnappings on the change in aggregate 
bank loans by department.  Firm-related kidnappings are not strongly correlated with changes in 
aggregated bank debt.  Moreover, there is no differential effect of firm-related kidnappings on 
loans to firms over loans to individuals.  
 
D. Cost Channel 
 
If kidnappings increase security costs, firms that face high kidnappings rates should report larger 
administrative costs.  Table 11 reports the results of running a regression similar to equation (1), 
with administrative expenses scaled by assets as the dependent variable.  We use the same 
                                                 
37 For each 4-digit ISIC industry code, we average the tradability measure from 1991 to 1995 (before the first year in our 
sample).  See Appendix Table 2 for more details. 
38 The regression is the spirit of the evidence about capital structure that Rajan and Zingales (1995) present for 
industrialized countries.   24
regional controls and firm-specific controls as in equation (1), with the exception of return on 
assets, which is replaced by sales over assets.  We also add the Herfindahl index on sales as a 
proxy for industry concentration.   
[Table 11] 
 
The coefficients of the kidnapping rates are negative for firm-related kidnappings and kidnappings 
of top and middle management, which implies that costs are reduced, rather than increased, by 
kidnappings.  We find evidence that kidnappings of top managers significantly increase costs, 
which is consistent with firms protecting people at the top.  However, the fact that kidnappings of 
owners do not increase costs in a similar way is counterintuitive.  Therefore, it is unlikely that the 
effect of kidnappings on investment is caused by increased administrative costs.  Our evidence 
on the cost channel is not conclusive, because we cannot observe what fraction of administrative 
costs corresponds to payments on private security, which is the most obvious component to be 




A number of different mechanisms may explain the negative effect of firm-related kidnappings on 
corporate investment.  Although we are not able to completely rule out other stories, the evidence 
in this section is consistent with the hypothesis that managers do not invest when they are afraid 
of becoming victims of kidnappings.  The fact that administrative costs and bank debt are not 
negatively affected by firm-related kidnappings suggests that property and income is not the only 
concern of investors and managers.  Personal security is likely to be an important concern for 
investors; perhaps more important than the security of property.   
 
The evidence in this section suggests that firm-related kidnappings have no differential effect on 
the investment of firms that depend on local markets.  This finding helps our identification 
strategy, because if omitted demand variables explain the negative correlation between firm-
related kidnappings and corporate investment, one should expect a more negative correlation for 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Cross-country studies provide useful evidence of the existence of a negative relation between 
investment and political instability (or other variables closely related with criminal activity).   
Although it is suggestive, this evidence cannot be used to infer a causal effect of crime on 
investment, because crime itself may be influenced by economic activity.   
 
In this paper, we exploit variation in different forms of crime within regions in Colombia to 
measure the effect of crime on investment.  Using firm-level data on a single country is useful to 
alleviate the problems faced by cross-country studies.  First, unobserved institutional 
characteristics and crime reporting standards vary more widely across countries than within 
countries.  Second, we are able to observe different types of crime and identify whether firms are 
directly attacked by crimes.  To the extent that omitted variables affect all types of crime in a 
similar way, we are able to identify the effect of firm-related crimes on investment.  Finally, we are 
also able to exploit cross-sectional differences in firms’ characteristics to address particular 
omitted variables stories.  As an example of the last point, we use the industry’s export share to 
identify firms that depend on Colombian demand.     
 
We find that kidnappings that target firms directly (attacking their employees, managers, or 
owners) have a non-negligible negative effect on firm-level investment.  By contrast, general 
forms of crime—such as overall homicides and kidnappings—do not have a significant effect on 
investment.  This second finding suggests that the negative effect of firm-related kidnappings on 
investment is not driven by omitted variables.  We also find that firm-related kidnappings affect 
industries that sell in Colombian markets as well as industries that sell in foreign markets, 
alleviating the concern that unobservable demand variables explain our basic result.  The 
distribution of violence and kidnappings in Colombia is not truly random.  Therefore, we have not 
totally solved here the identification problem of finding a causal effect of violent crime on 
investment.   
 
This paper presents evidence suggesting that firm-related kidnappings reduce investment 
because managers operate under the distraction of fear.  Individuals are not only scared away 
because of the probability of expropriation, but also because of threats to their personal security.  
Although we cannot totally rule out other explanations of why firm-related kidnappings reduce 
investment, we provide evidence suggesting that the mechanism is unlikely to operate through 
demand conditions, credit constraints, or administrative costs.      26
 
The dataset in this paper suggests a number of interesting questions for further research.  First, 
using data on individual loans, we will test more explicitly the hypothesis that banks ration 
borrowers in more violent places.  With data on interest rates charged on individual loans, it will 
be possible to further test for the existence of a “violence premium”.  Second, Colombia is an 
interesting laboratory for comparing the effects of crime against property to the effects of crime 
against individuals.  Third, if we treat crime as a distortionary tax, we are able to compute the 
deadweight loss of criminal activity.   
 
Recent empirical studies show that institutions that protect property rights foster investment and 
long-run economic growth (Besley, 1995; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Easterly and Levine, 1997, 
2003).  One of the most important issues for institutional design and policy reform is to 
understand what specific aspects of property rights are relevant for economic development 
(Acemoglu and Johnson, 2004).  The empirical challenge, therefore, is to dismantle the black box 
of property rights.  Similarly, the results in this paper suggest that crime may have significant 
effects on investment.  However, crime threatens both property rights and personal security.  Our 
findings suggest that both the security of property rights and personal security are important 
concerns for investors.  The challenge for future research, therefore, is to understand what 
particular aspects of crime are particularly relevant for economic activity and investment.   
 
 
   27
REFERENCES 
 
1.  Abadie, A., “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” NBER Working 
Paper No. 10859 (2004). 
2.  Abadie, A. and J. Gardeazabal, “The Economic Costs of Conflict:  A Case Study of the 
Basque Country,” American Economic Review 93 (2003):  113-132. 
3.  Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development:  an Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review 91 (2001):  1369-
1401. 
4.  Acemoglu, D. and S. Johnson, “Unbundling Institutions,” Mimeo, MIT, 2004. 
5.  Alesina, A. and R. Perotti, “Income Distribution, Political Instability and Investment,” 
European Economic Review 40 (1996):  1203-1228. 
6.  Angrist, J. and A. Kugler, “Coca, Conflict, and Rural Income:  Evidence from Colombia,” 
Mimeo, MIT and University of Houston (2004). 
7.  Barrera, F. and A.M. Ibañez, “Does Violence Reduce Investment in Education? A 
Theoretical and Empirical Approach,” Working Paper, CEDE-Universidad de Los Andes, 
Colombia (2004). 
8.  Barro, R.J., “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 106 (1991):  407-443. 
9.  Becker, G.S., “Crime and Punishment:  An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political 
Economy 76 (1968):  169-217. 
10. Bergquist, C., R. Peñaranda, and G. Sanchez (eds.), Violence in Colombia:  1990-2000:  
Waging War and Negotiating Peace, Wilmington, DE:  Scholarly Resources Inc. (2001). 
11. Besley, T., “Property Rights and Investment Incentives:  Theory and Evidence from 
Ghana,” Journal of Political Economy 103 (1995):  903-937. 
12. Bowden, P., Killing Pablo:  the Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw, New York, NY:  
Penguin Books (2002). 
13. Cardenas, M., “Economic Growth in Colombia:  A Reversal of Fortune?” Working Paper, 
Center for International Development, Harvard University (2002). 
14. Coetzee, J.M., Disgrace (1999). Reprinted, New York, NY:  Penguin (2000). 
15. Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Mimeo, World Bank 
(2001). 
16. De Long, J.B. and A. Shleifer, “Princes and Merchants:  European City Growth before the 
Industrial Revolution,” Journal of Law and Economics 36 (1993):  671-702.   28
17. Diaz, A.M. and F. Sanchez, “Geografía de los cultivos ilícitos y conflicto armado en 
Colombia,” Working Paper, CEDE-Universidad de Los Andes, Colombia (2004). 
18. Djankov, S. E. Glaeser, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, “The New 
Comparative Economics,” Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (2003a):  595-619. 
19. Easterly, W. and R. Levine, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy:  Policies and Ethnic Divisions,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997):  1203-1250. 
20. Easterly, W. and R. Levine, “Tropics, Germs, and Crops:  How Endowments Influence 
Economic Development,” Journal of Monetary Economics 50 (2003):  3-39. 
21. Fajnzylber, P., D. Lederman, and N. Loayza, “What Causes Violent Crime?” European 
Economic Review 46 (2002):  1323-1357. 
22. Fazzari, S.M., R.G. Hubbard, and B.C. Petersen, “Financing Constraints and Corporate 
Investment,” Brooking Papers on Economic Activity 1 (1988):  141-195. 
23. Garcia Marquez, G., News of a Kidnapping, Translation:  New York, NY:  Penguin Books 
(1997). 
24. Gaviria, A., “Assessing the Effects of Corruption and Crime on Firm Performance:   
Evidence from Latin America,” Emerging Markets Review 3 (2002):  245-268. 
25. Glaeser, E.L., “An Overview of Crime and Punishment,” Mimeo, World Bank (1999). 
26. Glaeser, E.L. and B. Sacerdote, “Why Is There More Crime in Cities?” Journal of Political 
Economy 107 (1999):  S225-S258. 
27. Glaeser, E.L., B. Sacerdote, and J.A. Scheinkman, “Crime and Social Interactions,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (1996):   507-548. 
28. Kaplan, S.N. and L. Zingales, “Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful 
Measures of Financing Constraints?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997):  169-
215. 
29. Katz, L.F., J.R. Kling, and J.B. Liebman, “Moving to Opportunity in Boston:  Early Results 
of a Randomized Mobility Experiment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (2001):  607-
654. 
30. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, “Law and Finance,” Journal 
of Political Economy 106 (1998):  1113-1155. 
31. Lucas, R.E., Jr., “Why Doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?” American 
Economic Review 80 (1990):  92-96. 
32. Mickolus, E.F., T. Sandler, J.M. Murdock, and P.A. Flemming, “International Terrorism:  
Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) Data Code Book,” Inter-University Consortium 
for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan (2003).   29
33. Miguel, E., S. Satyanath, and E. Sergenti, “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict:  An 
Instrumental Variables Approach,” Journal of Political Economy 112 (2004):  725-753.  
34.  Montenegro, A. and C.E. Posada, La violencia en Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia:   
Alfaomega (2001). 
35. North, D.C., Structure and Change in Economic History, New York, NY:  Norton, 1981. 
36. Porter, M.E., “The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City,” Harvard Business Review, 
May-June (1995):  55-71.  
37. Rajan, R. and L. Zingales, “What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some Evidence 
from International Data,” Journal of Finance 50 (1995):  1421-1460. 
38. Restrepo, J.A., M. Spagat, and J.F. Vargas, “The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil 
Conflict:  A New Dataset,” Mimeo, Royal Holloway College, University of London (2004). 
39. Riascos, A.J. and J.F. Vargas, “Violence and Growth in Colombia:  A Brief Review of the 
Literature,” Mimeo, Royal Holloway College, University of London (2003). 
40. Rubio, M., “Crimen y crecimiento en Colombia,” Coyuntura Economica 25 (1995). 
41. Safford, F. and M. Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land. Divided Society, New York, 
NY:  Oxford University Press. 
42. Sanchez, F., A.M. Diaz, and M. Formisano, “Conflicto, violencia y actividad criminal en 
Colombia: Un Análisis Espacial,” Working Paper, CEDE-Universidad de Los Andes, 
Colombia (2003). 
43. Stein, J.C., “Agency, Information, and Corporate Investment,” in G.M. Constantinides, M. 
Harris, and R. Stulz (eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Vol. 1A, Amsterdam, 
Elsevier (2003):  109-63. 
44. Streatfeild, D. Cocaine:  An Unauthorized Biography, New York, NY:  St. Martin’s Press, 
2002. 
45. The Economist, “Fear of Captivity,” June 19th (2004):  37. 
46. Urdinola, P., “The Hidden Cost of Violence:  Infant Mortality in Colombia,” Mimeo, 
University of California at Berkeley (2004).   30
APPENDIX 1:  CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE:  INVESTMENT AND INTERNATIONAL KIDNAPPINGS 
 
In this appendix, we present simple cross-country results linking kidnappings by international 
terrorists and investment.  We present them here for two reasons.  First, existing cross-country 
studies do not focus on the effect of crime itself, but rather on political instability.  Second, 
kidnappings by international terrorists are closer to the forms of crime we analyze in this paper 
(kidnappings, homicides, and guerrilla attacks).   
 
Investment is measured using Gross Capital Formation and net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
as a fraction of GDP.  We use an unbalanced panel of 196 countries from 1968 to 2002 to 
estimate the following equation using OLS with country- and year-fixed effects:   
 
t i t i t i t i t i capita per GDP s Kidnapping Investment , 5 , , , ε η ς γ β α + + + ⋅ + ⋅ + = −      (A1), 
 
where i indexes countries and t indexes years.  Investment, GDP, and population data are taken from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  The variable Kidnappingsi,t is the number of kidnappings 
per 100,000 population committed by international terrorists.  These data are taken from the ITERATE 
dataset (International Terrorism:  Attributes of Terrorist Events).
39   
 
To prevent our results from being driven by outliers, we exclude two country-year observations for which 
net FDI is larger than the GDP and one for which Gross Capital Formation is larger than the GDP.  We also 
exclude two observations for which the kidnappings rate is larger than 1 per 100,000 people.  Results are 
similar when we keep these observations. 
 
Appendix Table 1 summarizes the results of this regression.  The first two columns show the results for 
gross capital formation and the last two show the results using net FDI.  Columns (1) and (3) are a simple 
regression of investment on kidnappings and a constant with no other controls.  The regression lines in 
Figure 1 correspond to the regressions in columns (1) and (3). 
  
  [Appendix Table 1:  Cross-Country Evidence]  
                                                 
39 For a description of the dataset, see Mickolus et al. (2003).   31
Figure 1:  Investment and Terrorism 
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Source:  Sanchez et al. (2003), based on data from the National Police and DANE. 
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Source:  Sanchez et al. (2003), based on data from the National Police, the Ministry of Defense, 
and DANE.   34
Figure 4:  Map of Colombia 
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Figure 5:  Distribution of Violence across Departments 
A.  Kidnappings               B.  Homicides 
      
 
  More than 25 Kidnappings per 100,000 people            More than 90 Homicides per 100,000 people        
     Between 9 and 24.9 Kidnappings per 100,000 people            Between 60 and 89.9 Homicides per 100,000 people 
  Between 5 and 8.9 Kidnappings per 100,000 people            Between 40 and 59.9 Homicides per 100,000 people 
     Between 1 and 4.9 Kidnappings per 100,000 people            Between 10 and 39.9 Homicides per 100,000 people 
  Fewer than 1 Kidnapping per 100,000 people            Fewer than 10 Homicides per 100,000 people 
 
C.  Guerrilla Attacks (FARC) 
 
 
    
More than 12 guerrilla attacks per 100,000 people 
Between 8 and 11.9 guerrilla attacks per 100,000 people 
Between 3 and 7.9 guerrilla attacks per 100,000 people 
Between 1 and 2.9 guerrilla attacks per 100,000 people 
Fewer than 1 guerrilla attack per 100,000 people   36




Total:  7,209 firms 
    
More than 1,000 firms (1 department:  Bogota, D.C. 4,136)   
Between 200 and 999 firms (3 departments:  Atlantico, 339, Valle del Cauca, 813, 
Antioquia, 999) 
Between 100 and 199 firms (4 departments) 
Between 1 and 99 firms (16 departments) 
Departments with no firms (8 departments)   37
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year Total Kidnappings Firm-Related 
Kidnappings
Kidnappings of 







1996 1,091 220 193 3 1
1997 1,671 249 205 2 0
1998 3,023 453 371 25 32
1999 3,349 575 470 52 77
2000 3,697 NA NA NA NA
2001 3,050 265 168 23 60
2002 2,986 223 163 22 43
TOTAL 18,867 1,985 1,570 127 213
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)












1996 23 24 41 26,130 934
1997 442 38 31 24,828 1,146
1998 280 266 43 22,673 790
1999 98 168 57 23,820 736
2000 NA NA 42 25,859 1,931
2001 84 68 49 27,356 1,471
2002 112 57 31 28,363 1,210
TOTAL 1,039 621 294 179,029 8,218
Table 1:  Kidnappings, Homicides, and Guerrilla Attacks by Year
This table reports, by year, the total number of kidnappings, homicides, and guerrilla attacks in Colombia from 1996 to 2002.
Data on homicides and guerrilla attacks are obtained from the National Police/Ministry of Defense. Guerrilla attacks considers
only attacks perpetrated by FARC. Data on kidnappings are obtained from FONDELIBERTAD. Total Kidnappings are all
kidnappings reported in the FONDELIBERTAD dataset. Government Employees include local and national government, except
the Army and National Police. Firm-related Kidnappings correspond to kidnappings of firms' employees, owners, or
contractors; Top Management includes CEOs, presidents, vicepresidents, and board members; Top and Middle Management
includes division managers and supervisors plus Top Management. 
Kidnappings, Homicides, and Guerrilla Attacks by Year
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Private Firms Public Firms Total
1997 6,700 115 6,815
1998 7,159 67 7,226
1999 6,870 74 6,944
2000 7,134 75 7,209
2001 4,767 77 4,844
2002 4,450 94 4,544
TOTAL 37,080 502 37,582
Agriculture, hunting, and forestry 3,263
Fishing 106
Mining and quarrying 737
Manufacturing 10,391
Electricity, gas, and water supply 54
Construction 3,849
Wholesale and retail trade 9,779
Hotels and restaurants 641
Transport, storage, and communications 1,858
Financial intermediation 1,875
Real estate, renting and business activities 4,061
Public administration and defence 0
Education 57
Health and social work 150
Other community, social, and personal service activities 745
Private households with employed persons 16
Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 0
TOTAL 37,582
PANEL B. Distribution by Industry (Firm-Year Observations)
PANEL A: Number of Firms
Table 2:  Distribution of Firms
Panel A reports the distribution by year of firms in the sample. Data on private firms are
collected by Superintendencia de Sociedades in Colombia; data on public firms are obtained
from Superintendencia de Valores. Panel B reports the distribution of firm-year observations
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Mean Median Standard 
Deviation
Observations
Total Assets (million dollars) 7.773 2.433 18.558 37,582
Investment / TA (%) 0.290 -0.555 13.891 37,582
Return on Assets (%) 0.033 1.547 12.313 37,582
Real Cash / TA (%) 6.497 2.617 10.171 37,582
Foreign Ownership (Yes=1, No=0) 0.173 0.000 0.379 32,970
Exporter/Importer (Yes=1, No=0) 0.267 0.000 0.442 32,970
1 ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% using a two-tailed t-test
Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics:  Firms' Characteristics
This table reports descriptive statistics for the firm variables used in the empirical analysis. Investment is the
change in PPE and TA denotes Total Assets. Returns on Assets is the ratio of net income to total assets. The
dummy variable Foreign Ownership equals 1 if foreigners own at least 10% of the firm. Exporter/Importer is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm imports from or exports to other countries.







High Rate – 
Low Rate 
1
Total Assets (million dollars) Mean 7.643 8.175 0.530**
(0.109) (0.201) (0.223)
Observations 28,425 9,157
Investment/TA (%) Mean 0.509 -0.393 -0.903
(0.947) (0.118) (1.669)
Observations 28,425 9,157
Return on Assets (%) Mean -0.017 0.186 0.202
(0.074) (0.123) (0.148)
Observations 28,425 9,157
Real Cash / TA (%) Mean 6.640 6.055 -0.580***
(0.062) (0.098) (0.122)
Observations 28,425 9,157
Foreign Ownership (Yes=1, No=0) Mean 0.198 0.097 -0.102***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Observations 24,869 8,101
Exporter/Importer (Yes=1, No=0) Mean 0.258 0.296 0.038***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 24,869 8,101
1 ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% using a two-tailed t-test
Thist a bles p lits thes a m p le in two groups: (1) firm-year observations in departments with rates of total kidnappings above
the country median ("high") and (2) firm-year observations in departments with rates below the median ("low"). We compare
the mean of the firm-level variables used in the regression analysis.
Table 4:  Characteristics of Firms Located in Departments with High and Low Kidnapping Rates
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Kidnappings -0.0021
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.0926)
Kidnappings of Government  0.6890
Employees per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.7774)
Kidnappings of Army and -0.6855
National Police per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.7350)
Firm-Related Kidnappings -0.4433**
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.2202)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top and -2.5125***
Middle Management per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.7777)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top -3.0882*
Management per 100,000 pop.  t -1 (1.8092)
Kidnappings of Firms' Owners -5.9784***
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (2.2904)
Homicides -0.0087 -0.0052 -0.0050 -0.0020 0.0042 -0.0033 0.0031
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.0116) (0.0112) (0.0123) (0.0125) (0.0118) (0.0116) (0.0115)
Guerrilla Attacks -0.0323 -0.1324 -0.1591 -0.1061 -0.1093 -0.1343 -0.1423
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.1037) (0.2151) (0.2019) (0.1964) (0.2081) (0.1997) (0.1858)
Observations 37578 32734 32734 32734 32734 32734 32734
Number of firms 10,126 10,037 10,037 10,037 10,037 10,037 10,037
R-squared 0.9944 0.9954 0.9954 0.9954 0.9954 0.9954 0.9954
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for department clustering
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Total Kidnappings are all kidnappings reported in the FONDELIBERTAD dataset. Government Employees include local and national
government, except the Army and the Nacional Police. Firm-Related Kidnappings correspond to kidnappings of firms' employees,
owners, or contractors; Top Management includes CEOs, presidents, vice-presidents, and board members; Top and Middle Management
includes division managers and supervisors plus Top Management. Guerrilla Attacks includes FARC attacks reported by the National
Police/Ministry of Defense.
Table 5:  The Effect of Violence on Investment
This table reports OLS estimates of the effect on investment of kidnappings, homicides, and guerrilla attacks. The results correspond to
equation (1) in the text. The dependent variable is the change in Property, Plant, and Equipment scaled by lagged assets. Regressions
include firm covariates (log assets, cash holdings scaled by assets, and ROA); department controls (GDP per capita, primary school
enrollment, a poverty index, and the extension of roads in 1995); and fixed effects (by year, industry, department, and firm). The rates of
kidnappings, homicides, and guerrilla attacks are measured at the department level and are scaled by 100,000 population. The sample is an
unbalanced panel of firms located in Colombia with annual observations from 1996 to 2002. 
Dependent Variable:  Investment t / Total Assets t -1
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm-Related Kidnappings -7.0539
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (5.2085)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top and -10.9813
Middle Management per 100,000 pop. t -1 (9.2271)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top -27.8749
Management per 100,000 pop.  t -1 (37.1192)
Kidnappings of Firms' Owners -31.6153
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (26.2885)
Observations 534 534 534 534
Number of firms 147 147 147 147
R-squared 0.3248 0.3261 0.3245 0.3255
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm-Related Kidnappings -0.4334**
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.2134)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top and -2.3701***
Middle Management per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.6955)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top -3.0316*
Management per 100,000 pop.  t -1 (1.6594)
Kidnappings of Firms' Owners -5.9561***
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (2.0742)
Observations 32200 32200 32200 32200
Number of firms 9890 9890 9890 9890
R-squared 0.9955 0.9955 0.9955 0.9955
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for department clustering
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable:  Investment t / Total Assets t -1
PANEL B:  Firms not Directly Affected by Kidnappings
Table 6:  Direct and Indirect Effects
This table reports OLS estimates of the effect of kidnappings on investment, corresponding to equation (1) in the text. The dependent
variable is the change in Property, Plant, and Equipment scaled by lagged assets. Regressions include firm-specific controls (log assets,
cash holdings scaled by assets, and ROA); department controls (GDP per capita, primary school enrollment, a poverty index, the
extension of roads in 1995, FARC attacks per 100,000, and homicides per 100,000); and fixed effects (by year, industry, department,
and firm). Kidnapping rates are measured at the department level and are scaled by 100,000 population. For each type of kidnappings,
we present results for two subsamples: (1) firms whose employees or owners were subject to kidnappings reported in the
FONDELIBERTAD dataset (Panel A), and (2) firms whose employees and owners were not subject to kidnappings reported in the
FONDELIBERTAD dataset (Panel B). The total sample is an unbalanced panel of firms in Colombia with annual observations from
1996 to 2002.
PANEL A:  Firms Directly Affected by Kidnappings
Dependent Variable:  Investment t / Total Assets t -1
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Firm-Related Kidnappings in the Same Industry t -1 -0.0345**
(0.0160)





Firm-Related Kidnappings of Colombians -1.1941**
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.5948)
Firm-Related Kidnappings of Non-Colombians -1.6275
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (5.5899)
Foreign Ownership 0.2577
(0.7541)
Firm-Related Kidnappings         ×      ( Foreign Ownership ) 2.9903***
of Colombians per 100,000 t -1 (0.7623)
Firm-Related Kidnappings of     ×     ( Foreign Ownership ) -11.5103*
Non-Colombians per 100,000  t -1 (6.7052)
Observations 27960
Number of firms 7,997
R-squared 0.3617
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for department clustering
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable:  Investment t / Total Assets t -1
Table 7:  Industry and Nationality Effects
Panel A of this table reports OLS estimates of the effect on investment of own-industry and other industries kidnappings, corresponding to
equation (2) in the text. The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms in Colombia with annual observations from 1996 to 2002. The dependent
variable is the change in Property, Plant, and Equipment scaled by lagged assets. Regressions include firm-specific controls (log assets, cash
holdings scaled by assets, and ROA); department controls (GDP per capita, primary school enrollment, a poverty index, the extension of roads
in 1995, FARC attacks per 100,000, and homicides per 100,000); and fixed effects (by year, industry, department, and firm). 
PANEL A:  Kidnappings in the Same Industry vs. Kidnappings in Other Industries
PANEL B:  Firm-Related Kidnappings of Colombians and Foreign Citizens
Panel B reports OLS estimates of the effect on investment of firm-related kidnappings of Colombians and firm-related kidnappings of non-
Colombians. The estimates correspond to equation (3) in the text. The dummy variable Foreign Ownership equals 1 if foreigners own at least
10% of the firm.  Kidnapping rates are measured at the department level and are scaled by 100,000 population.
For each 2-digit ISIC industry code and department, the variable Firm-Related Kidnappings in the Same Industry is the sum of firm-related
kidnappings in that industry code but in other departments. Firm-Related Kidnappings in Other Industries is defined as the sum of firm-related
kidnappings over all other departments and all other industries divided by the total number of industries. Kidnapping rates are not scaled by
100,000 population.  
Dependent Variable:  Investment t / Total Assets t -1
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm-Related Kidnappings 1.5219
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (1.1971)
Firm-Related Kidnappings     ×     ( Industry Tangibility t -1 ) -0.0838*
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.0445)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top and 2.1177
Middle Management per 100,000 pop. t -1 (2.0088)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top and     ×     ( Industry Tangibility t -1 ) -0.1583
Middle Management per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.1058)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top 13.8862
Management per 100,000 pop.  t -1 (8.8206)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top     ×     ( Industry Tangibility t -1 ) -0.7882*
Management per 100,000 pop.  t -1 (0.4429)
Kidnappings of Firms' Owners 16.4253***
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (5.8181)
Kidnappings of Firms' Owners     ×     ( Industry Tangibility t -1 ) -0.9778***
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.3190)
Industry Tangibility t -1 0.5605*** 0.5443*** 0.5643*** 0.5435***
(0.0316) (0.0179) (0.0354) (0.0286)
Observations 32447 32447 32447 32447
Number of firms 9,965 9,965 9,965 9,965
R-squared 0.9962 0.9962 0.9962 0.9963
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for department clustering
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 8:  Asset Tangibility and the Effect of Kidnappings on Investment
This table reports OLS estimates of the effect on investment of firm-related kidnappings and their interaction with average industry
tangibility. The dependent variable is the change in Property, Plant, and Equipment scaled by lagged assets. Regressions include firm
covariates (log assets, cash holdings scaled by assets, and ROA); department controls (GDP per capita, primary school enrollment, a poverty
index, the extension of roads in 1995, guerrilla attacks per 100,000, and homicides per 100,000); and fixed effects (by year, industry,
department, and firm). Industry tangibility is the average by ISIC code of PPE as a percentage of total assets. Rates of kidnappings are
measured at the department level and are scaled by 100,000 population. The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms in Colombia with
annual observations from 1996 to 2002. 
Dependent Variable:  Investment t / Total Assets t -1
Firm-related Kidnappings correspond to kidnappings of firms' employees, owners, or contractors; Top Management includes CEOs,
presidents, vicepresidents, and board members; Top and Middle Management includes division managers and supervisors plus Top
Management.    
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( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )
Firm-Related Kidnappings -1.8006***
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.6301)
Firm-Related Kidnappings     ×     ( Industry Tradability ) 0.0432
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.0578)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top and -2.7547***
Middle Management per 100,000 pop. t -1 (1.0655)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top and     ×     ( Industry Tradability ) 0.0449
Middle Management per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.0801)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top -3.4916*
Management per 100,000 pop.  t -1 (1.9982)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top     ×     ( Industry Tradability) 0.0917
Management per 100,000 pop.  t -1 (0.1520)
Kidnappings of Firms' Owners -5.6704**
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (2.5337)
Kidnappings of Firms' Owners     ×     ( Industry Tradability) -0.0507
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.1108)
Industry Tradability -0.1655* -0.1638* -0.1561* -0.1503*
(0.0921) (0.0949) (0.0815) (0.0804)
Observations 32542 32542 32542 32542
Number of firms 10,035 10,035 10,035 10,035
R-squared 0.9954 0.9954 0.9954 0.9954
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for department clustering
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 9:  Firm-Related Kidnappings and Industry Tradability
This table reports the effect on investment of the interaction between firm-related kidnappings and industry tradability. The results correspond to
equation (4) in the text. The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms in Colombia with annual observations from 1996 to 2002. The dependent variable
is the change in Property, Plant, and Equipment scaled by lagged assets. Regressions include firm covariates (log assets, cash holdings scaled by assets,
and ROA); department controls (GDP per capita, primary school enrollment, a poverty index, the extension of roads in 1995, guerrilla attacks per
100,000, and homicides per 100,000); and fixed effects (by year, industry, department, and firm). We define Industry Tradability as the fraction of
exports in total sales at the industry level; this measure of tradability is an average from 1991 to 1995. Kidnappings are measured at the department
level and scaled by 100,000 population.  
Dependent Variable: Investment t / Total Assets t -1
Firm-related Kidnappings correspond to kidnappings of firms' employees, owners, or contractors; Top Management includes CEOs, presidents,
vicepresidents, and board members; Top and Middle Management includes division managers and supervisors plus Top Management.    
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm-Related Kidnappings 0.0863
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (1.3872)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top and 2.7795*
Middle Management per 100,000 pop. t -1 (1.4683)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top 3.0019
Management per 100,000 pop.  t -1 (3.5050)
Kidnappings of Firms' Owners -1.0257
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (5.7009)
Homicides 0.0139 0.0045 0.0131 0.0157
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.0304) (0.0201) (0.0231) (0.0236)
0.2995 0.2993 0.3196 0.2957
Guerrilla Attacks (0.2345) (0.2411) (0.2333) (0.2327)
per 100,000 pop. t -1
Observations 28581 28581 28581 28581
Number of firms 8,995 8,995 8,995 8,995
R-squared 0.4065 0.4065 0.4065 0.4065
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for department clustering
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 10:  The Effect of Violence on Firm Borrowing
This table reports OLS estimates of the effect on firm borrowing of kidnappings, homicides, and guerrilla (FARC) attacks.
The dependent variable is the change in bank debt scaled by lagged assets. Regressions include firm-specific controls (log
sales, cash holdings scaled by total assets, ROA, and PPE scaled by total assets), department controls (GDP per capita,
primary school enrollment, a poverty index, and the extension of roads in 1995), and fixed effects (by year, industry,
department, and firm). Kidnappings, homicides, and guerrilla attacks are measured at the department level and scaled by
100,000 population. The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms located in Colombia with annual observations from 1996 to
2002. 
Firm-Related Kidnappings correspond to kidnappings of firms' employees, owners, or contractors; Top Management
includes CEOs, presidents, vice-presidents, and board members; Top and Middle Management includes division managers
and supervisors plus Top Management. Guerilla attacks includes FARC attacks reported by the National Police/Ministry of
Defense.
Dependent Variable:  ∆Bank Debt t / Total Assets t -1
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm-Related Kidnappings -0.0228*
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.0117)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top and -0.0028
Middle Management per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.0271)
Kidnappings of Firms' Top
Management per 100,000 pop.  t -1 0.3145*
(0.1875)
Kidnappings of Firms' Owners 0.0200
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.1016)
Homicides 0.0004** 0.0003* 0.0001 0.0002
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Guerrilla Attacks -0.0003 -0.0006 0.0014 -0.0006
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0024)
Observations 33045 33045 33045 33045
Number of firms 10,309 10,309 10,309 10,309
R-squared 0.7211 0.7211 0.7211 0.7211
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for department clustering
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 11:  The Effect of Violence on Firms' Costs
This table reports OLS estimates of the effect on firms' administrative costs of kidnappings, homicides, and guerrilla (FARC)
attacks. The dependent variable is administrative expenses scaled by assets. Regressions include firm-specific controls (log
assets, cash holdings scaled by assets, and sales scaled by assets); department controls (GDP per capita, primary school
enrollment, a poverty index, and the extension of roads in 1995); industry controls (Herfindahl index on sales); and fixed
effects (by year, industry, department, and firm). Kidnappings, homicides, and guerrilla attacks are measured by department
and are scaled by 100,000 population. The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms located in Colombia (annual observations
from 1996 to 2002). 
Firm-Related Kidnappings correspond to kidnappings of firms' employees, owners, or contractors that are reported in the
FONDELIBERTAD dataset; Top Management includes CEOs, presidents, vice-presidents, and board members; Top and
Middle Management includes division managers and supervisors plus Top Management. Guerilla Attacks includes FARC
attacks reported by the National Police/Ministry of Defense.
Dependent Variable:  Administrative Expenses t / Total Assets t -1  48
(1) (2) (3) (4)





(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP)
Kidnappings -14.1041** -17.7092* -38.9887** -17.1976**
per 100,000 people i,t -1 (6.6213) (10.2079) (17.4799) (8.2632)
log (GDP per capita) i,t -5 0.2131 -0.3087
(0.6481) (1.2615)
Constant 2.2227*** -0.0392 23.0562*** 25.3302***
(0.1919) (4.6986) (0.4791) (9.3247)
Country Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes
Observations 3688 3688 4019 4019
Number of countries 160 160 172 172
R-squared 0.0012 0.3498 0.0031 0.5514
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for country clustering
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
This table reports the OLS estimate of the effect of kidnappings on investment in an unbalanced panel of 196 countries
from 1968 to 2002. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) scaled by
GDP, and the dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is Gross Capital Formation scaled by GDP. The variable
Kidnappings is obtained from the ITERATE dataset; it is defined as the number of kidnappings by international terrorists
divided by 100,000 population. The series of Net FDI, Gross Capital Formation, and GDP per capita are from the World
Bank's WDI dataset. We exclude country-year observations for which Net FDI (2 observations) or Gross Capital
Formation (1 observation) is larger than the GDP. Similarly, we exclude 2 country-year observations for which the rate
of kidnappings is larger than one.
Appendix Table 1:  Cross-Country Evidence
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Variable Name Description Years covered Level of 
Aggregation
Source
Poverty index Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas (Unfulfilled 
Basic Needs).  Similar to the one-dollar-per-day 
poverty measure.
1990-2002 Municipality DANE, CEDE
GDP per capita Real GDP divided by population. GDP is 
measured in constant Colombian pesos of 1994.
1990-2001 Department DANE
Paved roads in 1995 Paved roads (hundreds of squared kilometers) in 
1995.
1995 Municipality DANE, CEDE
Primary school enrollment Students enrolled in primary school divided by 
population between 6 and 12 years.
1993-2002 Municipality DANE, CEDE
Population Estimated total population, based on the 1993 
census and annual population projections.
1990-2003 Municipality DANE
Producer price index Country-wide producer price index. 1990-2003 Country-wide DANE
Industry tradability Industry's exports divided by industry's sales.  
Exports and sales are measured in current 
Colombian pesos.
1991-1998  4-digit ISIC 
code 
DANE
Gross Credit Total bank loans to individuals and firms (in 
current Colombian pesos).
1996, 1997, 1999, 
2000, 2001
 Department  Superintendencia 
Bancaria
Net Credit Gross credit minus provisions for bad loans (in 
current Colombian pesos).
1996, 1997, 1999, 
2000, 2001
 Department  Superintendencia 
Bancaria
Commercial Loans Bank loans to firms (in current Colombian pesos). 1996, 1997, 1999, 
2000, 2001
 Department  Superintendencia 
Bancaria
Loans to Individuals Bank loans to individuals for the purchase of 
consumption goods.
1996, 1997, 1999, 
2000, 2001
 Department  Superintendencia 
Bancaria
This table summarizes department, municipality, and industry variables that are used in the empirical analysis, but are not explained in the
main body of the text. All series are annual, except for paved roads, which is observed only for 1995. DANE is the National Administrative
Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrative Nacional de Estadisticas); CEDE is the Center for Research on Economic
Development (Centro para Estudios Sobre el Desarrollo Economico) at Universidad de Los Andes; and Superintendencia Bancaria is an
agency of the Colombian government in charge of the prudential regulation and supervision of financial institutions.
Appendix Table 2:  Department and Industry Variables:  Data Description
 





























Antioquia 9.30 1.28 1.05 0.05 0.09 0.52 0.27 0.10 126.87 3.33
Atlántico 1.02 0.15 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 30.22 0.03
Bogotá, D.C. 1.68 0.26 0.21 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.06 39.64 0.06
Bolívar 6.44 0.51 0.37 0.04 0.09 1.03 0.09 0.06 24.04 1.78
Boyacá 4.04 0.33 0.21 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.11 0.04 20.30 2.21
Caldas 4.20 0.53 0.36 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 88.10 1.16
Caquetá 14.24 0.73 0.67 0.03 0.03 1.27 3.22 0.15 107.33 11.52
Cauca 5.40 0.39 0.29 0.02 0.07 0.82 0.18 0.16 43.02 6.43
Cesar 25.92 2.39 1.48 0.12 0.06 1.22 0.47 0.16 71.03 2.98
Córdoba 1.64 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.00 27.79 0.55
Cundinamarca 8.17 0.85 0.73 0.10 0.15 0.36 0.07 0.20 40.22 6.02
Chocó 12.30 1.74 1.15 0.04 0.29 0.70 0.71 0.45 50.42 5.40
Huila 5.96 0.71 0.57 0.02 0.12 0.36 0.20 0.01 51.87 4.51
Guajira 13.78 1.84 1.48 0.06 0.24 1.00 0.21 0.52 61.11 4.77
Magdalena 8.87 0.97 0.64 0.15 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.13 49.73 2.54
Meta 16.29 1.79 1.51 0.06 0.35 0.83 1.00 0.17 65.60 11.01
Nariño 3.06 0.15 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.85 0.31 0.03 29.64 4.19
N. de Santander 8.25 1.19 0.89 0.08 0.11 0.81 0.41 0.26 90.54 1.59
Quindío 1.61 0.16 0.16 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.00 65.43 1.88
Risaralda 4.16 0.62 0.46 0.09 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.04 99.06 2.52
Santander 8.31 1.02 0.76 0.04 0.10 0.57 0.16 0.11 46.46 2.92
Sucre 9.37 0.93 0.77 0.13 0.05 0.37 0.16 0.05 31.42 2.75
Tolima 7.38 0.84 0.74 0.06 0.16 0.34 0.31 0.04 52.48 3.54
Valle del C. 4.06 0.55 0.48 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.02 0.12 92.77 1.19
Arauca 12.88 1.58 1.09 0.24 0.07 1.44 0.25 0.70 104.81 21.78
Casanare 29.20 5.06 3.14 0.16 0.30 0.69 0.20 0.18 99.36 9.81
Putumayo 5.72 0.63 0.17 0.00 0.04 0.59 0.66 0.03 65.12 10.45
Amazonas 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 9.32 1.99
Guanía 3.08 0.80 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.44 35.86
Guaviare 17.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.04 0.00 115.76 31.02
Vaupés 35.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 12.90 0.00 23.32 31.86
Vichada 10.99 3.64 3.34 0.00 0.00 1.59 1.59 0.14 23.50 9.95






























Observations 224 192 192 192 192 192 192 224 224 224
Mean 8.95 0.46 0.39 0.04 0.04 0.29 0.71 0.13 58.21 7.43
Std. deviation 20.24 1.47 1.44 0.10 0.10 0.68 6.49 0.27 35.78 15.09
Std. deviation  18.21 1.30 1.30 0.09 0.09 0.59 4.65 0.22 15.55 11.85
within department
PANEL B:  Means and Standard Deviation, 1996-2002
Appendix Table 3:  Kidnappings by Year and Department
Panel A reports average rates (per 100,000 pop.) of homicides, guerrilla attacks, and kidnappings by department in Colombia from 1996 to 2002. Panel B reports
the mean and standard deviation of these variables in a panel of all 32 departments from 1996 to 2002. Data on homicides and guerrilla attacks were obtained from
the National Police/Ministry of Defense. Guerrilla attacks include only attacks perpetrated by FARC. Data on kidnappings were obtained from the
FONDELIBERTAD dataset. Total Kidnappings are all kidnappings reported in the FONDELIBERTAD dataset; Government Employees include local and
national government employees (judiciary, legislative, and executive branches), except the Army and National Police. Firm-related Kidnappings correspond to
kidnappings of firms' employees, owners, or contractors; Top Management includes CEOs, presidents, vicepresidents, and board members; Top and Middle
Management includes division managers and supervisors plus Top Management.  Annual population is projected by DANE.
PANEL A:  Average Rates by Deparment, 1996-2002 (per 100,000 pop.)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: ∆ Net Credit 
(%GDP)




∆ Loans to 
Individuals 
(%GDP)
Firm-Related Kidnappings 0.1666 0.5416 0.0237 0.0856
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.3635) (0.5659) (0.1137) (0.1012)
Homicides -0.1070 -0.0927 -0.0009 -0.0187
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.1007) (0.0837) (0.0170) (0.0150)
Guerrilla Attacks 0.0881 0.0547 0.0043 0.0055
per 100,000 pop. t -1 (0.1205) (0.0960) (0.0167) (0.0169)
GDP per capita t -1 0.1829 0.2050 -0.2862 0.0835
(1.6269) (1.3462) (0.5133) (0.2301)
Constant 1.2765 -0.5551 -0.4514 0.0121
(4.0710) (2.0935) (1.1084) (0.5769)
Observations 96 96 96 96
R-squared 0.3718 0.5098 0.5834 0.5671
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for department clustering
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Appendix Table 4:  Effect of Firm-Related Kidnappings on Aggregate Loans
We regress four measures of aggregate loans at the department level on the rates of firm-related kidnappings,
homicides, and guerrilla attacks (FARC) also at the department level. Data on homicides and guerrilla attacks
were obtained from the National Police/Ministry of Defense. Data on kidnappings were obtained from the
FONDELIBERTAD dataset. Annual population data is projected by DANE. Firm-Related Kidnappings
correspond to kidnappings of firms' employees, owners, or contractors. Data on aggregate loans are from
Superintendencia Bancaria for the years 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, and 2001. Net credit, gross credit,
commercial loans, and loans to individuals are all scaled by department GDP. All regressions include
department and year fixed effects.
 